A new frontier of control? Case studies in the changing form of job control in South African industrial relations¶
Eddie Webster (1984). A new frontier of control? Case studies in the changing form of job control in South African industrial relations. Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa, Carnegie Conference Paper. SALDRU, School of Economics, University of Cape Town.
| Type | conference paper |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | survey fieldwork |
| Period studied | 1973–1984 |
| Regions | South Africa, Durban, East Rand, Natal |
| Themes | unions strikes, labour markets wages, business and state, politics ideology elections, resistance social movements, manufacturing industrial policy, inequality poverty unemployment |
| Citation key | webster1984 |
Argument¶
Webster uses Edwards's concept of management control and Goodrich's 'frontier of control' to argue that industrial relations is a power struggle over control rather than a system of rules. Pre-Wiehahn despotic control through the white supervisor and the induna entered crisis as firms grew, technology tied workers together, and strikes broke out from 1973. The state and capital answered with liaison committees, then with the Wiehahn and Riekert reforms, which combined union recognition with repression and aimed to separate production politics from 'global' politics. Seven plant-level case studies of emerging unions show workers winning organisational rights, limits on dismissal and retrenchment, and wider bargaining demands. They have made little inroad on how tasks are directed or performance evaluated. Bargaining demands such as the 'social wage' are pushing the frontier from the politics of production toward global politics.
Evidence and method¶
A questionnaire and interviews with emerging unions, then seven plant-level agreements in motor, food, paper, retail, chemical, textile and metal, examined through interviews with management and unions. Also union documents (FOSATU Worker News, MAWU memos), management memos, Industrial Court judgements, press reports, and the author's earlier work on the 1973 Durban strikes, East Rand stoppages and foundries.
Place in the debates¶
- Industrial relations as a system of rules (Flanders) vs a process of control and power struggle (Hyman) (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Takes the Hyman/Marxist side: industrial relations is a power struggle over control, and grievances are settled by relative power rather than by rules.
- Wiehahn reform: incorporation and control of black unions vs genuine concession to worker power (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Sees Wiehahn as a contradictory restructuring of repression plus reform. Recognition aimed to control unions from above but also opened space for shop-floor organisation.
- Management's 'right to manage' vs union encroachment on prerogatives (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Finds the major encroachment on discipline and dismissal, but little on directing tasks or evaluating performance.
Findings¶
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The 1973 Durban strikes exposed the crisis of despotic control on the shop floor. (p. 7)
an estimated 100000 workers broke the decade of 'industrial peace' and took to the street-s with a demand for wage increases
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Strike involvement among African workers rose sharply after 1973 compared with the previous decade. (p. 8)
those involved in disputes were to rise as high as 100,000 in 1973 and never fell below 30,000
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Employers rapidly promoted management-initiated liaison committees after 1973 to pre-empt independent unions. (p. 8)
between 1973 and 1975 the number of liaison committees increased from 118 to 1751
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Mechanised, linked production (technical control) gave black workers leverage and favoured union building, following Edwards. (p. 10)
Technical control linked together the plant's workforce, and when the line stopped, every worker necessarily joined the strike.
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Capital and the state saw union recognition as a way of depoliticising labour. (p. 11)
a certain form of trade union recognition could in fact facilitate a separation of the politics of production from
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Workers joined unions mainly to defend themselves against arbitrary treatment rather than for material benefits. (p. 12)
The majority joined unions out of a desire to defend worker rights from what they see as arbitrary or unfair treatment by management
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The emerging unions had a small but fast-growing workplace presence with formal agreements in over half of the workplaces organised. (p. 13)
In 420 of these workplaces, formal agreements have been signed by these unions.
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Most of the seven agreements followed strikes in the struggle for recognition. (p. 14)
In five of the seven cases, the signing of the agreement was preceded by a period of struggle between management and the emerging unions that resulted in a strike.
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Workers made no significant gains over task direction and performance evaluation, the first two elements of managerial control. (p. 18)
workers have made no significant inroads on the first two levels (directing tasks and evaluating performance) of managerial control.
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The main gain was in discipline and reward, by limiting unilateral dismissal. (p. 18)
The third element (i.e. discipline and reward) is the one where workers have made the most significant encroachment on managerial control
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Agreements do not guarantee legality: management abandoned them when it judged itself strong, as at AECI. (p. 21)
waived industrial legality in the workplace and exercised their traditional prerogative to dismiss
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Wage claims linked to unemployed dependants show bargaining moving toward the social wage and global politics. (p. 22)
claimed a wage increase of 35% on the grounds that
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author's questionnaire to emerging unions with follow-up interviews (stage a of research strategy) | author survey or fieldwork | c. 1983-84 | Establishes the nature of workplace organisation in each union and the rights being won in plant agreements, from which the seven companies were selected. |
| Seven company case studies: plant agreements and interviews with management and union (motor, food, paper, retail, chemical, textile, metal) | interviews oral history | post-Wiehahn, c. 1983-84 | Main evidence for the rights to organise, limit dismissal during strikes, and challenge dismissal and retrenchment, summarised in Tables 1-5. |
| Internal management memos on 'right to manage' | company records or reports | c. 1983-84 | Used to show management anxiety over the 'right to manage' and prerogatives after the frontier of control shifted. |
| Webster PhD thesis, 'The Labour process and forms of workplace organization in South African foundries' (Wits, 1983) | author survey or fieldwork | to 1983 | Author's own earlier fieldwork and archival work supports claims on craft control, supervisor/induna control, the Defy dispute and liaison committees. |
| Webster and Sitas, Stoppages in the East Rand Metal Industry, FOSATU Occasional Publication No. 3 | union or movement records | 1981-82 | Evidence that rejection of arbitrary management control was the central demand in the majority of 1981 East Rand strikes. |
| Statistics on liaison and works committees 1973-77 and African workers in industrial disputes | official statistical series | 1973-1977 | Counts of committees and strike participants indicate the depth of the 1973-76 crisis of control and the employer offensive. |
| Union membership and shop steward data for emerging unions (400,000 signed-up; 756 workplaces; 420 agreements; 6,000 shop stewards) | union or movement records | c. 1983-84 | Describes the scale of the emerging unions and the workplace-based organisation of shop steward structures. |
| Sample of shop stewards and workers in the study | author survey or fieldwork | c. 1983-84 | Gives the sample size for the ratio of shop stewards to workers. |
| Wiehahn Commission and Riekert Commission reports | commission or official report | 1977-1979 | Used to show the state's strategy of incorporating African unions into the Industrial Council system and dividing workers by urban residence rights. |
| Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act and its amendment introducing liaison committees | legislation gazette | 1973 | Legislative basis for liaison committees introduced after the 1973 strikes. |
| Industrial Court judgements on unfair labour practices (via Haysom, Industrial Court in S.A. Review 1983, and Nupen, SALB) | secondary literature compilation | 1980-1983 | Summarises court rulings that strengthen union challenges to unilateral dismissal and retrenchment. |
| MAWU memo on liaison committees after the Heineman strike | union or movement records | 1976 | Shows that unions and workers viewed liaison committees as ineffective safety valves. |
| Barlow Rand statement after the 1976 Heineman dispute | company records or reports | 1976 | Illustrates management recognition that liaison committees had failed and legislation needed revision. |
| FOSATU Worker News (Aug 1983 No. 23; Sept 1983 No. 24) | union or movement records | 1983 | Describes the paper-industry no-selective-dismissal right and union definitions of living wage. |
| Rand Daily Mail, 31 January 1984 | newspapers periodicals | January 1984 | Documents management's letter that further stoppages would count as part of the same strike in the retail case. |
| Financial Mail, 23 Dec 1983 (Hofmeyer, 'Barlow Rand and FOSATU') and Umbiko we MAWU, Vol 1 No 3 | newspapers periodicals | 1983 | Source for Rosholt's view of union demands as a threat to private enterprise and for union demands on pension funds. |
| South African Labour Bulletin and South African Review articles (Webster, Lambert, Nupen, Innes, Keenan) | secondary literature compilation | 1982-1983 | Support accounts of East Rand stoppages, managerial perceptions (Godsell), union growth and monopoly capitalism. |
| Webster, The 1973 Durban Strikes (Ravan, 1974) | secondary literature compilation | 1973 | Source for the estimate of 100,000 striking workers in 1973. |
New data¶
Author-collected questionnaire and interview evidence from all emerging unions plus seven case-study plants (motor, food, paper, retail, chemical, textile, metal), with plant agreements coded into five comparative tables; sample of 405 shop stewards and 17,205 workers noted.
Inference¶
Quantification: Descriptive tables.
Qualitative comparative case study of seven well-organised plants, using Edwards's typology of control and Goodrich's 'frontier of control', supported by tables of agreement clauses, interviews and secondary historical narrative; no statistical testing.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The 1973-76 period saw a crisis of control in despotic supervisor/induna management, evidenced by strikes and rapid expansion of liaison committees as a management response. (p. 8) | Committee counts and strike participation figures (source unspecified), the Defy and Heineman cases, and Webster's thesis. | Partial data |
| The state's Wiehahn/Riekert restructuring was a contradictory combination of repression and reform aimed at controlling emerging unions and separating the politics of production from global politics. (p. 11) | Wiehahn and Riekert Commission reports, Urban Foundation statements, and the author's interpretation. | Asserted |
| Plant agreements gave workers three rights: organising inside the factory, limits on dismissal during strikes, and procedures to challenge dismissal and retrenchment. (p. 12) | Seven case-study agreements and interviews summarised in Tables 1-4 and Appendices A-C. | Partial data |
| Workers made the most inroads into discipline and reward (dismissal power), but little into directing tasks and evaluating performance. (p. 18) | Case-study agreements, the textile overtime exception, the chemical job evaluation clause, and respondents' views. | Partial data |
| Grievances are settled by power-based bargaining rather than by reference to agreements, as shown when AECI dismissed strikers despite legal strike procedures. (p. 21) | Table 3 strike examples, the AECI anecdote, Kuhn's US study, and Foster's speech. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Emerging unions had approximately 400,000 signed-up members, about 12% of the workforce, with 6,000 shop stewards. (p. 13) | Union membership figures of unspecified provenance. | Partial data |
The author's caveats¶
The author states the study is not representative of the black workforce; all seven cases involve well-organised, central rather than peripheral workers. Interviews with management and union were conducted only where possible.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument rests on seven well-organised plants selected by the author, with no control group of weakly organised or non-union workplaces and no systematic strike or dismissal data. Sources for the committee and strike statistics and membership figures are not named, and the agreements and interview records are unpublished. Official Department of Manpower strike and Industrial Court statistics, or a broader survey of plant agreements and grievance outcomes, would test claims about shifting control better.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.