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Capital Restructuring and the Modification of the Racial Division of Labour in South Africa

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Robert Davies (1979). Capital Restructuring and the Modification of the Racial Division of Labour in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2. Taylor & Francis.

Type journal article
Scope Economics and economic history of apartheid
Method theoretical or conceptual
Period studied 1960–1990
Regions South Africa
Themes labour markets wages, business and state, politics ideology elections, unions strikes, manufacturing industrial policy, inequality poverty unemployment, resistance social movements
Citation key davies1979

Argument

Davies argues that business is now pushing to modify the racial division of labour and scrap job reservation because the conditions that had made the colour bar tolerable have ended. In the 1960s and early 1970s, boom conditions and abundant foreign capital allowed skilled-labour shortages to be mitigated by 'floating the colour bar'. From the mid-1970s, falling profitability, reduced foreign investment and the political crisis after the Soweto uprising made reform an imperative for capital. A strategy of raising the organic composition of capital requires more supervisory and mental labour, and the black working class's militancy rules out raising exploitation directly. The reform will bring little benefit for most Africans: on his projections, less than one-sixth of the 1990 economically active African population would gain. He treats it as a limited victory for popular struggle that the bourgeoisie will turn to its own advantage. The argument is Marxist and structural (Poulantzas-influenced) and rests on illustrative calculations rather than archival work.

Evidence and method

Official and press sources: Financial Mail, Rand Daily Mail, SAIRR Surveys of Race Relations, Reserve Bank Annual Economic Report 1977, Minister of Labour statements, HSRC manpower report and Chamber of Mines estimates (Parsons). ILO occupational data for a cross-country comparison (Table 1). His own projections of African occupancy of ISCO 0-3 categories to 1990 (Table 2). Secondary literature including First et al. and Johnstone.

Place in the debates

  • Liberal vs revisionist/Marxist views of apartheid and capitalist interests (see Liberal vs revisionist: was apartheid functional or dysfunctional for capitalist growth?). Revisionist. He holds that the racial division of labour accorded with capital's interests until the mid-1960s and that capital now seeks to change it because of crisis and class struggle. He rejects the view that change flows from the normal growth of capitalism alone.
  • Colour bar, skills shortages and 'floating the colour bar' (see The job colour bar, white labour and its erosion). The shortage of skilled labour was real from the mid-1960s, but floating the colour bar and foreign capital made it tolerable until the mid-1970s.
  • Reform of job reservation and the Wiehahn Commission (see The job colour bar, white labour and its erosion). Skeptical. He sees it as restructuring in the interests of capital, with new controls over African unions and a concealed colour bar, not as real emancipation.
  • African advancement through upward social mobility (see The job colour bar, white labour and its erosion). He rejects it as a myth: even on optimistic assumptions only a small minority of Africans would benefit.

Findings

  • Pressures from normal capitalist growth alone did not produce reform of the racial division of labour; economic crisis and urban black struggles did. (p. 5)

    it was only under the pressures of the current economic crisis and the recent struggles of the urban blacks that such a modification has become imperative from the bourgeois point of view

  • South Africa's share of its economically active population in professional, administrative, clerical and sales occupations fell below the norm for middle-level industrialized countries by 1970. (p. 4)

    having only 16.5 per cent of its economically active population in ISCO categories 0-3 compared to a norm of about 18-20 per cent

  • A Chamber of Mines estimate implies a very large shortfall of white-collar workers by 1990 unless other races fill the posts. (p. 4)

    this indicates a shortage of 1,448,000 unfilled white collar places unless they are turned over to persons of other races

  • Floating the colour bar meant buying out white workers' acceptance of deskilling, which was tolerable in the boom. (p. 6)

    Low paid black workers would be brought in to perform newly mechanized manual functions in the labour process previously performed by whites.

  • Black working-class militancy ruled out raising exploitation directly, so capital had to raise labour productivity through a higher organic composition of capital. (p. 10)

    the greater degree of organization and militancy displayed by the black working class in recent years has made any strategy relying predominantly on such direct assaults too risky

  • Business organizations pressed for the abolition of job reservation after the Soweto uprising, and the state moved only after white unions had been won over. (p. 13)

    virtually all the major organizations representing bourgeois fractional class interests-including, for example, the Afrikaner Handelsinstituut-have been committed to a policy of actively seeking to end job reservation

  • Removing racist barriers was also a tool for restoring foreign investor confidence. (p. 12)

    attracting new foreign investment capital has become crucially dependent on persuading potential foreign investors that some of the more obvious at least of the factors underlying South Africa's political instability

  • Under the 'minimum' scenario, Africans in the new white-collar categories would remain a tiny share of the African workforce by 1990. (p. 16)

    the numbers of Africans occupying places in these new petty bourgeois categories would by 1990 be 396,774 (3.89 per cent of the projected 'economically active' African population)

  • Even on optimistic assumptions, restructuring would benefit under one-sixth of the African workforce while worsening structural unemployment. (p. 17)

    the potential gains from any such process of restructuring would be limited even on the most optimistic assumptions to less than one-sixth of the total 'economically active' African population of 1990

Evidence ledger

Sources used

Source Kind Period How used
Financial Mail articles (2 June 1978, 28 July 1978, 14 April 1978, 28 April 1978, and 1976-77 issues) newspapers periodicals 1976-1978 Documents recent job reservation scrapping, closed shop agreement abolition, union reactions, and bourgeois statements on free enterprise and reform.
Rand Daily Mail reports (1970, 1976-1978) newspapers periodicals 1970-1978 Source for ministerial figures, employer and business leader quotations, and the Labour Minister's announcements on job reservation.
SAIRR, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1976 and 1977 secondary literature compilation 1976-1977 Supplies Parsons' unpublished manpower projections, business memoranda and speeches, and African wage data by sector.
Official vacancy statistics (April 1977) as reported by the Minister of Labour official statistical series April 1977 Shows continuing shortages of 99,000 in professional, semi-professional and technical grades despite recession.
ILO, 'The Occupational Structure of Employment 1960-1980' and ILO Yearbooks of Labour Statistics international trade or finance data 1956-1975 Basis of Table 1 comparing the share of the economically active population in ISCO categories 0-3 across countries in the early 1960s and early 1970s.
Economic Development Programme of the Republic of South Africa 1976-1981 commission or official report 1976-1981 projections Supplies projected annual growth rates of the economically active population underlying the 1990 projections in Table 2.
Parsons (Chamber of Mines) manpower demand estimates company records or reports projection to 1990 Provides the 2,796,000 white-collar demand figure and the 780,000 skilled and semi-skilled production jobs added in Table 2C.
Vermaak et al., HSRC Report No. 70, 'The Demand and Supply of Manpower, Part 1' commission or official report 1977 Cited for shortages of technicians, supervisors and artisans in production.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Export Trade of the Republic of South Africa (Reynders Commission), Vol II (RP 69/72) commission or official report 1972 Evidence that the state introduced measures to accelerate floating the colour bar after 1972.
Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, on US Corporate Interests in Africa (Senator Dick Clark, 1978) international trade or finance data 1976 Supports the claim that returns on US capital in Nigeria and Libya exceeded those in South Africa in 1976.
Simkins and Clarke, Structural Unemployment in Southern Africa, Table 20 secondary literature compilation 1978 Source of the estimated 22.4 per cent structural unemployment rate.
Statements of business leaders and organisations (Oppenheimer, Suzman, Hersov, Leistner, FCI, Handelsinstituut, Urban Foundation) employer association records 1970-1977 Quoted to show bourgeois positions on floating the colour bar, then on repealing job reservation and attracting foreign investors.
Secretary of Labour evidence to Cillie Commission, quoted in Rand Daily Mail 18 March 1977 commission or official report 1977 Shows official reluctance to abolish job reservation before the Wiehahn Commission was appointed.
First et al., The South African Connection and Johnstone, 'White Prosperity and White Supremacy' secondary literature compilation 1970-1973 Used to document the process of floating the colour bar and to supply the Oppenheimer quotation.

New data

The author constructs Table 1, a cross-country comparison of ISCO 0-3 shares, from ILO data. He also builds Table 2, a scenario projection of African occupancy of ISCO 0-3 places in 1990 under two assumptions about white and Coloured/Asian shares.

Inference

Quantification: Illustrative figures.

Marxist structural-theoretical argument supported by press and business quotations and by official and international statistics. Table 1 compares South Africa with peer countries, and Table 2 is a scenario projection resting on assumed parameters rather than estimation.

Key claims

Claim Basis Strength
South Africa has experienced shortages of skilled, supervisory and clerical labour since the mid-1960s, and they persisted through the recession. (p. 4) Official vacancy statistics (April 1977), the ILO cross-country comparison in Table 1, and Parsons' Chamber of Mines projection. Partial data
During the boom, shortages were mitigated by floating the colour bar and by abundant foreign capital, so no major capital fraction needed to confront the colour bar. (p. 8) Secondary literature (First et al., Johnstone), the Reynders Commission report, quotations from Oppenheimer and Suzman, and Marxian theory on circulation time. Illustrative or anecdotal
The business class and its organisations committed to ending job reservation after the 1976 uprising, and white union bureaucracies were being won over. (p. 13) Press reports (Rand Daily Mail, Financial Mail), SAIRR Survey 1976, and business memoranda. Illustrative or anecdotal
Even on optimistic assumptions, restructuring would give only a small minority of Africans (at most about one-sixth) skilled or white-collar places by 1990. (p. 17) Table 2 scenario arithmetic using the Economic Development Programme growth rates, the 1974 occupational shares, and Parsons' 780,000 production jobs figure. Partial data
Raising the organic composition of capital to restore profitability would increase structural unemployment and deskilling alongside more mental and supervisory places. (p. 10) Theoretical argument plus the Simkins and Clarke estimate of 22.4 per cent structural unemployment. Asserted

The author's caveats

The author notes that all the shortage calculations have defects. He says the Coloured and Asian figure in Table 2 is selected arbitrarily, 'simply selected for convenience'. He describes the projection as tentative and says the political effects cannot be predicted with certainty.

Gaps in the evidence

The argument asserts a profitability crisis but cites no profit-rate series; sectoral profit and investment data from the national accounts and company reports, available at the time, would test it. Claims about class strategy rest on press quotes rather than archives of employer associations, Chamber of Mines and state records, which would show actual bargaining positions. Table 2 relies on assumed shares, and 1970 census occupational data by race plus later labour force surveys would allow better-grounded projections and later checks.

Replicability: Data described but not public.