The Republic of Transkei: Two Years of Independence 1976-1978¶
Denis Venter (1979). The Republic of Transkei: Two Years of Independence 1976-1978. Occasional Paper, Transkei Series No. 2 (first published as a two-part article in Africa Institute Bulletin vol. 16). South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg.
| Type | report |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | policy analysis |
| Period studied | 1976–1978 |
| Regions | Transkei, Griqualand East, Butterworth, Umtata |
| Themes | bantustans removals influx, agriculture land, manufacturing industrial policy, politics ideology elections, mining migrant labour |
| Citation key | venter1979 |
Argument¶
Venter assesses the first two years of Transkei's nominal independence in two parts. The first part argues that economic development is the state's first priority but is constrained by a subsistence-dominated agricultural sector, a small domestic market and heavy reliance on South African finance. The government's response is state-led industrial growth points (Butterworth, Umtata), industrial crops and an export-oriented harbour scheme. The second part treats the Griqualand East land claim and Transkei's severing of diplomatic relations with Pretoria in 1978. It argues that South Africa's insistence on the 1936 land allocation and its juridical stance undermine the credibility of separate development, and that Transkei's dependence on South Africa makes its position precarious. The tone is that of a policy commentary, and it is moderately sympathetic to Transkei's consolidation claim.
Evidence and method¶
Official and semi-official figures, apparently from Transkei government and Transkei Development Corporation sources, on employment, investment, land use and transfers. Population census figures for Griqualand East from 1904 to 1970. The Steyn Committee report (1976). Statements by Vorster and Matanzima. Treaty and annexation history. The sources are largely uncited in the text.
Place in the debates¶
- Viability and credibility of the homeland (separate development) policy (see Homelands, separate development, decentralisation and removals). Critical of South African land policy: argues the 1936 land allocation and unresolved consolidation undermine the credibility of separate freedoms, though the author accepts the homeland framework and supports developing the homelands' core areas.
- Whether Transkei's leaders were South African puppets (see Homelands, separate development, decentralisation and removals). Rejects the puppet view. Argues Matanzima used separate development as a stepping-stone to black nationalism.
- Prospects for homeland economic development and self-sufficiency (see Homelands, separate development, decentralisation and removals). Cautiously optimistic about industrial growth points and agricultural potential, while stressing subsistence-economy constraints and dependence on South Africa.
Findings¶
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Transkei depends on migrant employment in South Africa for a large share of its workforce. (p. 4)
It is estimated that 327 000 Transkeian migratory workers have to find work in South Africa.
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Industrial decentralization is concentrated at Butterworth, promoted by the Transkei Development Corporation. (p. 4)
By far the most spectacular development has taken place at Butterworth, where 54 industrial enterprises have been established.
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Industrial employment creation by 1976 was modest relative to the migrant labour force. (p. 4)
by 1976 nearly 17 236 work opportunities had been created in a variety of industries varying from plastic products and chemicals
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Foreign capital provides a minority of investment. (p. 5)
About 20 percent of the total investment in Transkei is derived from foreign sources, mainly West German
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Subsistence agriculture yields only a small fraction of potential output. (p. 5)
The production of cereals is only 10 percent of the potential
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Cattle are scarcely commercialised, and the land is overstocked. (p. 5)
It is further calculated that Transkei is overstocked by some 500 000 large animal units.
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Land use is skewed towards grazing and afforestation rather than cropping. (p. 5)
only 37 percent is utilised for crop production, while 80 percent is used as grazing land and for afforestation
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Transkei remains highly dependent on South Africa through migrant labour, transfers and seconded staff. (p. 9)
Furthermore, there are almost 327 000 Transkeian migrant labourers working in the Republic
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Matanzima gained little on disputed territory in the independence negotiations. (p. 10)
it was clear that Dr. Matanzima had made little progress on the question of disputed land
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Territorial fragmentation is a serious obstacle to planning and administration. (p. 12)
Fragmentation of Transkei into three separate territories is extremely undesirable from the viewpoint of overall planning and development
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Venter reads Matanzima as a nationalist and not a puppet. (p. 12)
he has in fact used the policy of separate development as a stepping-stone to further black nationalism
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Population censuses 1904, 1936, 1960 and 1970 (Griqualand East: Matatiele and Mount Currie districts) | population census | 1904-1970 | Racial population counts over seven decades are used to challenge the Steyn Committee's claim that Griqualand East was never a Bantu tribal territory. |
| Census maps (1970) showing language distribution in Griqualand East | maps spatial data | 1970 | Used to show that most blacks in the area are Xhosa-speaking and only a few are Zulu. |
| Report of the Steyn Committee on incorporating Griqualand East into Natal (October 1976) | commission or official report | 1976 | Its finding that Transkei's claim lacks factual foundation is the official position which the author queries with census data. |
| 1844 treaty between Mpondo Chief Faku and Britain; 1861 cession and 1879 annexation | other | 1844-1879 | Treaty and cession history is used to set out the competing Transkei and South African legal claims to Griqualand East. |
| Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936 | legislation gazette | 1936 | Land allocation ceiling under the Act is cited as the obstacle to compensating for alienated land and to consolidation. |
| South African Government Gazette proclamation, 24 March 1978 (transfer of Matatiele and Mount Currie to Natal) | legislation gazette | 1978 | Proclamation of the transfer of the disputed districts to Natal is cited as the trigger of the dispute. |
| Parliamentary budget vote statement by Prime Minister Vorster on the land question | parliamentary debates | 1978 | Used to show South Africa's stated position that it has fulfilled its land undertakings. |
| 1964 OAU Cairo Summit resolution on Border Disputes between African States | other | 1964 | Explains the OAU non-recognition of Transkei and the inviolability-of-boundaries principle. |
| Unspecified Transkei/South African government and Transkei Development Corporation figures on employment, investment, agricultural output, land use and budget transfers | official statistical series | 1976-1978 | Supplies the figures on jobs created, investment, cereals and cattle output, land use, migrant numbers and financial transfers that underpin the development assessment. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Descriptive and normative commentary: scattered official and census figures are combined with historical-legal narrative and the author's judgement. There is no systematic analysis or formal comparison.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Transkei has made rapid industrial progress, with 17,236 work opportunities created by 1976 and 54 enterprises in Butterworth, and 33 new enterprises employing 3,500 workers in 1976/77–1977/78. (p. 1) | Unattributed government/TDC employment and investment figures. | Partial data |
| Agriculture remains the main problem: cereal output is a tenth of potential, the cattle off-take is minimal and the land is overstocked. (p. 2) | Unattributed production and livestock estimates. | Partial data |
| Transkei is heavily dependent on South Africa for budget support, civil servants and migrant wages. (p. 6) | Unattributed figures on transfers, seconded officials and migrant earnings. | Partial data |
| The Steyn Committee's finding that Griqualand East was never Bantu territory is questionable, since the black population there was substantial and growing from 1904 to 1970. (p. 6) | Census counts 1904, 1936, 1960 and 1970 and census language maps. | Systematic data |
| South Africa's rejection of the Griqualand East claim rests on legal grounds of cession and annexation, but a pre-independence settlement would have lent more credibility to separate development. (p. 8) | Historical treaty and annexation record, Vorster's statement and the author's normative argument. | Asserted |
| Transkei's break with South Africa was not driven by internal political weakness: Matanzima retained a dominant majority in the National Assembly. (p. 7) | Assembly seat count stated without a source. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that agricultural potential is projected rather than actual, and that estimates such as the urbanisation rate are approximate ("estimated"). The text offers no systematic discussion of data quality.
Gaps in the evidence¶
Almost all economic figures lack named sources, dates and definitions, so the employment, investment and output claims cannot be checked. Transkei Development Corporation reports, Transkei budget and accounts, and the South African Department of Statistics and Bantu Affairs series on migrant earnings and transfers existed then and would test the claims. Archival records of the independence negotiations and Transkei's submitted 'new facts and documents' would better support the land-claim arguments.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.