Territorial Manipulation in Apartheid South Africa: Resettlement, Tribal Politics and the Making of the Northern Ciskei, 1975-1990¶
Luvuyo Wotshela (2004). Territorial Manipulation in Apartheid South Africa: Resettlement, Tribal Politics and the Making of the Northern Ciskei, 1975-1990. Journal of Southern African Studies, 30(2). Taylor & Francis (Carfax).
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Wider apartheid literature |
| Method | archival narrative |
| Period studied | 1975–1990 |
| Regions | Northern Ciskei, Hewu/Whittlesea, Glen Grey, Herschel, Transkei, Eastern Cape |
| Themes | bantustans removals influx, agriculture land, politics ideology elections, resistance social movements, demography urbanisation |
| Citation key | wotshela2004 |
Argument¶
Homeland consolidation and forced resettlement in the Northern Ciskei were not simply imposed from above by the apartheid state. Using the relocation of Glen Grey and Herschel people after their 1975 excision to the Transkei, the article argues that homeland politicians, chiefs, planners, local authorities and the relocatees themselves shaped who moved, where they settled and who benefited. It argues that consolidation also gave Africans more land for exclusive occupation at regional scale. Land was increasingly dispensed for political and social control rather than production or environmental concerns. Resettlement also created tribal-authority patronage systems and new local politics, such as the Residents' Associations, that the central state could not control.
Evidence and method¶
Archival records (Ciskei Department of Agriculture and Forestry land-use plans, Whittlesea magistrate records, Border Rural Committee proceedings, Ciskei foreign affairs files, Land Restitution Commission report, Quail Commission), the Surplus People Project report, newspapers, and oral interviews with chiefs, officials and relocatees conducted 1994-1999. Drawn from the author's Oxford DPhil thesis.
Place in the debates¶
- State-centred versus local-agency accounts of forced removals and resettlement (see Homelands, separate development, decentralisation and removals). Accepts that the state drove the policy but argues that local actors (homeland politicians, chiefs, planners, relocatees) shaped its implementation and outcomes. Moves beyond the Surplus People Project's focus on removals as events to their long-term consequences.
- Role of the reserves/homelands: labour reservoir versus social control and dumping ground for 'surplus people' (see Homelands, separate development, decentralisation and removals). Notes the shift from the 1960s onward to social control and housing surplus people. Stresses that land was dispensed for political ends, with planners making only limited provision for viable agriculture.
Findings¶
-
Consolidation brought more land under exclusive African occupation at regional scale, despite the degradation of black land rights. (p. 4)
homeland consolidation provided more land for exclusive black occupation, at least on a regional scale.
-
The apartheid state could not fully control relocation, including who moved, where they settled and who benefited. (p. 4)
it could not always determine who moved, where they moved to, how they settled and who benefited.
-
Transkei's bargaining power secured Glen Grey and Herschel in exchange for a smaller compensatory land transfer to the Ciskei. (p. 7)
the Ciskei was to be compensated with 150,000 hectares (370,644 acres) of largely white-owned agricultural land as part of its consolidation.
-
A large share of families relocated without official assistance, lured partly by Ciskei politicians, so officials lost control of the process. (p. 12)
about a third of the families who were also lured by local Ciskei politicians moved to the relocation site without official assistance.
-
Transit camps had catastrophic conditions and high mortality in the early years. (p. 12)
The East London-based newspaper, the Daily Dispatch, estimated the death toll (resulting from mainly malnutrition-related cases) between September 1976 and January 1977, at 300.
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Chiefs competed for followers because land allocations were proportional to numbers, producing self-selected and manufactured tribal affiliation. (p. 16)
More numbers equalled a larger territory.
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Those not affiliated with the relocated chiefs got no land and stayed in the transit camp through the 1980s. (p. 17)
those who identified with chiefs who had not left Herschel and those who did not associate with the three allocated chiefs remained without land allocations
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Sebe used a new Thembu Tribal Authority headed by his brother-in-law to build a patronage network as he moved towards one-party rule. (p. 17)
Sebe worked harder to consolidate authority through chiefs and tribal authorities to create a patronage system as he moved away from a competitive electoral process to install one-party rule.
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Housing delivery fell far short of plans: Whittlesea North was planned for 10,000 houses but only 1,400 were funded by 1983. (p. 18)
the IWG only succeeded in funding the development of 1,400 houses by the end of 1983, resulting in the abortion of the multi-relocation scheme
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The plan could not provide viable agriculture for most relocatees, who depended on outside income. A white farmer put the minimum viable unit at 171 hectares. (p. 19)
it was impossible for the Ciskei to allocate 171 hectares each, even to the 4,496 families who were direct beneficiaries of the new land.
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Hewu's territory and population expanded sharply between 1974 and 1990. (p. 21)
By 1990, its territory had expanded to about 80,000 hectares and its population had increased to over 100,000 people during the same period.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Surplus People Project Report, Forced Removals in South Africa, 5 vols (1983), esp. vol. 1 and vol. 2 (Eastern Cape) | secondary literature compilation | 1983 (fieldwork early 1980s) | Provides the typology of removals, descriptions of the Thornhill/Loudon camps, and population estimates for Sada/Silver City, which the article draws on and then extends. |
| Report of the 1980 Ciskei Commission (Quail Commission), Government Notice No. 14, 1980 | commission or official report | 1980 | Source for the planned size of consolidated Ciskei (830,000 ha) and for the political bargaining over consolidation. |
| Archives of the Whittlesea Department of Agriculture (AWDA), file (107) N.2/11/3/7, Reclamation Report on Shiloh Reserve, 18 March 1959 | state archives | 1959 | Documents the early history of Shiloh and Hewu as a site of land consolidation and of the Sada camp. |
| Department of Land Affairs, Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, East London, Report 90/95 (Feb 1995), Ex-Herschel Residents/Group 4 | commission or official report | 1995 (covering 1975-76) | Establishes the proclamations, the timing and numbers of families removed, and the valuation problems. |
| Archives of the Border Rural Committee, East London, Proceedings of Meetings Regarding the Excision of Glen Grey and Herschel, 24-25 April 1975 | union or movement records | April 1975 | Records the promises made by Deputy Secretary Uys and the compensatory land tours (Released Areas 59, 60, 71, 72). |
| G. Godden Private Papers, Biminco Memorandum (Ciskei delegation to RSA/Ciskei Bilateral Ministerial Commission), 26 April 1988 | state archives | 1988 | Supplies consolidation and Hewu livestock/grazing figures. |
| Proclamations R237 and R254 of 1975; Government Notices 1840 (1959) and 564 (1961); Acts 27 of 1913, 18 of 1936, 52 of 1951, 68 of 1951; Ciskeian Agricultural Development Act 5 of 1973 | legislation gazette | 1913-1975 | Provides the legal framework for consolidation and the dates of the excision and incorporation of Glen Grey and Herschel. |
| Archives of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry (former Ciskei), Bisho: Ciskei Technical Services Planning Division, Zweledinga Development Plan 1979 and Ntabethemba Land Use Plan 1978/79 | state archives | 1978-1979 | Source for Tables 1 and 2 on land allocations, families resettled and hectarage. |
| Archives of the Ciskei Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Statistics of the Technical Services Division for Ciskei Livestock Numbers 1981-1990 | official statistical series | 1981-1990 | Supports the claim of overstocking against the official carrying capacity. |
| Setplan Archives, Report No. 537 0/1, Amavundle Tribal Land Area (June 1994) | company records or reports | 1994 | Source for Ciskei carrying capacity and livestock numbers 1981-87. |
| ECARMS, King William's Town: Archives of Ciskei Department of Foreign Affairs, SA & Ciskei Agreements vol. 2, file 5/3/1/1; Trust Land & Tribal Matters vols 1 and 9, file 5/3/2 | state archives | 1983-1987 | Documents the housing programme, the Thembu Tribal Authority's patronage, urbanisation plans and Hewu stock numbers. |
| Local Magistrate's Office Records, District Record Book of Whittlesea Magistrate Office, Bantu Trust Land, Bantu Authorities and Hewu Regional Authority, 1978-1985 | state archives | 1978-1985 | Documents tribal authority creation and the development of Whittlesea North. |
| Interviews with relocatees, chiefs, a magistrate and a planner (Qetuka, Ngqendesha, Bunjwa, Malefana, Hinana, Ndumela/Mgebisa/Mabilietsa, Bukuva; Godden interview by W. Beinart), 1994-1999 | interviews oral history | 1994-1999 | Supplies testimony on self-initiated relocation, flexible chief registration and tribal allocation, and the planning process. |
| Daily Dispatch (East London), 13 January 1977; Eastern Province Herald, 5 May 1982 | newspapers periodicals | 1977, 1982 | The Daily Dispatch gives the camp death toll; the Herald gives a white farmer's estimate of the land an African farmer needs. |
| Development Bank of Southern Africa, Ciskei Population Profile 1985; Ciskei government population census 1991 | official statistical series | 1984-1991 | Population estimates for Hewu, which the author criticises as underestimates. |
| Author's doctoral thesis, 'Homeland Consolidation, Resettlement and Local Politics in the Border and the Ciskei Region', DPhil Oxford 2001 | author survey or fieldwork | 1960-1996 | Underlies the article's main arguments and is cited for most narrative and archival detail. |
| Switzer, Power and Resistance in an African Society (1993); Mears (1993); de Wet et al. (1997) as data compilations | secondary literature compilation | 1970-1980 | Switzer is the source for the claim that Hewu population density more than doubled 1970-1980. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Descriptive tables.
Archive-based regional case study using process tracing and narrative reconstruction. Archival planning documents, official correspondence and interviews with relocatees, chiefs and planners are used to show how local actors shaped consolidation, supplemented by descriptive tables of land allocation and some population and livestock figures.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Homeland consolidation, even with forced removals, gave more land for exclusive African occupation at the regional scale (Northern Ciskei received former white commercial farms). (p. 319) | Quail Commission and RA land transfers, Ciskei planning documents (Tables 1-2), and the hectarage figures for Hewu in 1974 and 1990. | Partial data |
| The state did not fully control the resettlement: about a third of families moved without official assistance, and officials lost control of the process. (p. 327) | DLA CRLC Report 90/95 figures on families transported by BAD versus self-moved, and interviews with Qetuka, Ngqendesha and Bunjwa. | Partial data |
| Transit camps (Thornhill/Loudon, Bushby Park, Pavet, Oxton) caused severe environmental degradation and high mortality in 1976-79. (p. 327) | Daily Dispatch death toll estimate, SPP field descriptions, and Kruger's description. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Tribal authority affiliation was a flexible, self-selected mechanism, and chiefs and planners used follower numbers to gain land, producing land winners and landless losers. (p. 331) | Interviews with Chief Malefana, Ndumela and Bukuva; Ciskei land-use plans; Sebe's rallies. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Resettlement plans gave land to about 4,496 families, with the allocations concentrated in chief-led tribal authority areas, while the Thembu Tribal Authority under Hebe monopolised site allocation for its followers. (p. 330) | CTSPD Zweledinga and Ntabethemba plans (Tables 1-2), IWG figures and ECARMS correspondence. | Partial data |
| The resettled area was overcrowded and overstocked by the early 1980s, with the plan offering little viable agricultural future for most relocatees. (p. 334) | Ciskei Department of Agriculture livestock statistics, Setplan report, the white farmer's quote, and the 171 ha per family benchmark. | Partial data |
| Hewu's territory grew from about 30,000 to about 80,000 ha and its population from about 40,000 to over 100,000 between 1974 and 1990, with official population figures underestimating congestion. (p. 336) | DBSA Ciskei Population Profile 1985, Ciskei 1991 census, SPP estimates; the author critiques the dwelling-count method. | Partial data |
The author's caveats¶
The author notes that no reliable record was kept of the land relocatees occupied in Glen Grey and Herschel, that the land promises were vaguely defined, that the number of Herschel relocatees may be higher than reported because some fled to Qwaqwa, and that DBSA and 1991 census population figures were underestimates based on dwelling counts.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument that consolidation gave 'more land' and that the beneficiaries were broad lacks systematic household-level data on who received allocations, the size of holdings, and livelihoods before and after removal. Comparable cadastral and land-register data, allocation registers from the tribal authorities, and household surveys existed in principle at the time or can be recovered from the Ciskei archives. The mortality figure rests on a single newspaper estimate; death and clinic records, and reliable census data for the camps, would test claims about conditions and demographic change better.
Replicability: Data described but not public.