The Economic Effects of the Removal of Africans from the Western Cape¶
Leo Katzen (1962). The Economic Effects of the Removal of Africans from the Western Cape. The Black Sash (Die Swart Serp), December 1962/January 1963 (from a speech at a symposium of the S.A. Institute of Race Relations). Black Sash.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | policy analysis |
| Period studied | 1945–1962 |
| Regions | Western Cape, Cape Peninsula, Cape Town |
| Themes | bantustans removals influx, labour markets wages, manufacturing industrial policy, business and state, demography urbanisation |
| Citation key | katzen1962 |
Argument¶
Katzen argues that removing Africans from the Western Cape, the Eiselen Line policy, is feasible but only at an economic cost. African labour is mostly unskilled and complements Coloured and White labour rather than competing with it, so Africans have enabled Coloured advancement into semi-skilled and skilled work. Removal would therefore reduce Coloured and White employment and income, raise employers' costs, deter new investment and push industry toward other regions. The Reserves and border areas offer the removed Africans no alternative opportunities. He expects a gradual 'creeping paralysis' rather than sudden disaster. The argument rests on census and municipal employment figures plus economic reasoning about complementary labour, and he treats the human misery as more important than the economics.
Evidence and method¶
1960 census population figures; municipal and divisional employment figures for June 1962; the 1956/57 industrial census; 1954/55 industrial employment shares; ministerial statements (M. C. Botha, Verwoerd); a report of the permanent committee on location of industry in border areas; anecdotal reference to Caltex demanding a labour guarantee.
Place in the debates¶
- Do Africans displace Coloured workers in the Western Cape (Coloured labour preference)? (see Coloured Labour Preference policy in the Western Cape). Rejects the government claim (Botha) that Africans take Coloured jobs. He argues labour is not homogeneous and that African and Coloured labour are complementary, so removal would reduce Coloured employment.
- Economic feasibility and cost of apartheid/separate development policy (see Homelands, separate development, decentralisation and removals). Argues removal is administratively possible but economically costly, producing slower growth, lower investment and higher costs. This is an early liberal-economist cost-of-apartheid argument.
Findings¶
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Africans are a small share of the Western Cape population (118,000 of 1.2 million, per the 1960 census). (p. 1)
there are 1,200,000 people of alt races in this area, including 118,000 Africans, less than 10% of the total.
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A large share of Africans in the area are in registered employment (48,000 in June 1962). (p. 1)
there were 48,000 Africans in registered employment in June, 1962, in this area.
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African employment is overwhelmingly unskilled, which leaves semi-skilled work open to Coloureds. (p. 1)
Ninety per cent of the Africans employed in the Western Cape do unskilled work
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The policy of replacing Africans with Coloureds cannot be carried out in government employment, where some 5,000 Africans work. (p. 1)
The last figure is significant in view of the Government's declared policy of replacing Africans by Coloureds where possible.
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African labour was a condition of post-war growth and created jobs for Coloureds. (p. 2)
It has been a condition of economic growth here — Africans have created jobs for Coloureds rather than taken them away.
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Freezing African numbers and pressuring employers to hire Coloureds raises costs and deters new investment. (p. 2)
Uncertainty about the future labour position is drivine new investment elsewhere.
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The Western Cape's share of Union industrial employment was already falling, and removal would add to the decline. (p. 2)
this had fallen to 12% ten years later, (1954/1955 are the most recent figures available.)
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The Reserves and border areas offer no real alternative for removed Africans. (p. 2)
The Reserves are poverty-stricken, and the most recent report of the permament committee for the location of industry in the border areas
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The overall effect is a slow, economy-wide cost rather than immediate collapse. (p. 2)
creeping paralysis whose cost will have to be borne not only by the people of the Cape, but the South African community as a whole.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1960 Population Census (African population of the Western Cape area, 118,000 of 1,200,000) | population census | 1960 | Establishes the African population of the Western Cape area (118,000, under 10% of total; 75,000 in Greater Cape Town districts). |
| Municipal and Divisional authorities' figures on Africans in registered employment, June 1962 | official statistical series | June 1962 | Gives 48,000 Africans in registered employment, used to derive 65% employment ratio and extrapolate 75,000 employed for the wider area. |
| 1956/57 Industrial Census | industrial mining census | 1956/57 | Shows 30,000 Africans employed in private manufacture and building construction and that half of building workers are African. |
| Industrial census 1954/55 figures on share of Union industrial employment in the Western Cape | industrial mining census | post-war to 1954/55 | Shows the Western Cape's share of Union industrial employment fell from 16% to 12%, indicating relative industrial disadvantage. |
| Unspecified figures on African employment in Peninsula commerce, garages, milk distribution, government departments and S.A.R.&H. | official statistical series | c. 1962 | Documents African employment in non-industrial occupations, including nearly 5,000 in government departments and railways, to show Coloureds cannot replace them. |
| Unemployment estimate for the Peninsula (about 7,000 of all races) | official statistical series | 1962 | Used to argue that unemployment is low, rebutting the claim that Africans take Coloured jobs. |
| Speech by M. C. Botha, Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, to the Institute of Administrators of Non-European Affairs, Mossel Bay | parliamentary debates | 1962 | Official statement of the policy rationale (Africans displacing Coloureds) that the article rebuts; also the extended definition of the Western Cape. |
| Report of the permanent committee for the location of industry in the border areas | commission or official report | c. 1962 | Cited to show industrialists have little interest in relocating to border areas, so removed Africans lack alternatives. |
| Informal information on Caltex Refinery's demand for a labour guarantee | interviews oral history | c. 1962 | Anecdotal example that new firms demand guaranteed African labour before investing in the Western Cape. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Illustrative figures.
Argumentative economic reasoning from a handful of census and administrative figures, plus assertions about labour complementarity between African, Coloured and White workers; a proportional extrapolation from Greater Cape Town to the wider area; no formal model or systematic comparison.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| Africans are under 10% of the Western Cape population but probably at least 20% of the labour force, with 65% of residents employed. (p. 1) | 1960 census population plus municipal/divisional registered employment (48,000 in June 1962); labour force share is an estimate with no recent figures. | Partial data |
| Some industries (e.g. building, where half of workers are African) depend heavily on African labour and would not survive at present size without it. (p. 1) | 1956/57 industrial census figures for manufacture and construction; the survival claim is asserted. | Partial data |
| Africans have not displaced Coloureds; African labour is complementary (ninety per cent unskilled) and enabled Coloureds to move into semi-skilled and skilled jobs. (p. 2) | Assertion about occupational structure and the unemployment figure of about 7,000; no occupational breakdown by race given. | Asserted |
| Removal of Africans would reduce Coloured and White employment, shrink the regional economy, and raise costs. (p. 2) | Theoretical reasoning on labour complementarity; no empirical projection. | Asserted |
| The Western Cape's share of Union manufacturing employment fell from 16% to 12% over about ten years, and the removal policy will worsen the trend and deter new investment. (p. 2) | Industrial census figures to 1954/55; Caltex anecdote for investment deterrence. | Partial data |
| Africans removed from the area have no alternative economic opportunities in the Reserves or border industries. (p. 2) | Report of the permanent committee on location of industry in border areas; general assertion that the Reserves are poverty-stricken. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| Nearly 5,000 Africans are employed in government departments and the S.A.R.&H., showing the policy of replacing Africans with Coloureds is not feasible. (p. 1) | Unspecified Peninsula employment figures. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
The author's caveats¶
Notes the poor state of statistical services, definitional problems in delimiting the Western Cape, that no recent labour-force figures are available, that the 1956/57 industrial census is the latest detailed report, and that the cost of the policy cannot be measured precisely.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument lacks occupational and wage data by race to test complementarity versus substitution between African and Coloured workers, and no firm-level or sectoral cost estimates of labour shortage. A time series of regional industrial output, investment and employment would be needed to attribute the relative decline to the removal policy rather than distance from the Rand or rail tariffs. Much of this existed in the industrial censuses, labour department and municipal records of the time, and could be assembled now from archives.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.