The Emergence, Struggles and Achievements of Black Trade Unions in South Africa from 1973 to 1984¶
Johann Maree (1985). The Emergence, Struggles and Achievements of Black Trade Unions in South Africa from 1973 to 1984. Labour, Capital and Society (Travail, Capital et Société) 18:2.
| Type | journal article |
| Scope | Economics and economic history of apartheid |
| Method | archival narrative |
| Period studied | 1919–1984 |
| Regions | South Africa, Durban/Pietermaritzburg (Natal), Witwatersrand/East Rand, Cape Town/Western Cape, East London |
| Themes | unions strikes, labour markets wages, resistance social movements, business and state, sanctions divestment, manufacturing industrial policy, politics ideology elections |
| Citation key | maree1985 |
Argument¶
Maree traces the revival of African trade unionism after the 1973 Durban strikes, through near-collapse in 1976, to rapid growth after the state's 1979 switch to legal recognition. He asks why the 'independent' unions endured when three earlier cycles (ICU, CNETU, SACTU) collapsed. He offers five explanations: the industrial base and capital concentration created by the 1960s boom; the Durban strike wave and wider Black mobilisation; astute union strategy (shopfloor organisation first, political confrontation later); dependence on foreign capital combined with international anti-apartheid pressure; and the state's 1979 policy shift after the Wiehahn Commission. By 1984 survival was no longer in question; the issue was how unions could best advance working-class interests.
Evidence and method¶
Primary sources from the author's PhD research (references omitted in the article), secondary literature on the ICU, CNETU and SACTU, government reports (Mouton Commission, Wiehahn), industrial and manufacturing censuses, SALDRU union directories and statistics, Financial Mail, SAIRR Survey and the South African Labour Bulletin.
Place in the debates¶
- Why did SACTU collapse, and what made the 1970s unions durable? (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Cites Lambert, who blames SACTU's subordination to the Congress Alliance and premature mass political campaigns. Maree adds that SACTU leaders sought shortcuts around slow workplace organisation, and stresses that the 1970s unions built shopfloor power first.
- Why did the state concede legal recognition of African unions in 1979? (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Combines factors: skills shortages, industrial and political conflict, international pressure, regional decolonisation, and a shift in the class base of the government. Recognition was meant to co-opt and control unions, and was the 'lesser of two threats'.
- Role of international pressure and foreign capital (see Black trade unions: growth, wage effects, Wiehahn and strategy). Argues that dependence on foreign capital and the disinvestment lobby helped the unions survive, since they targeted subsidiaries of multinationals. Their international campaigns for recognition brought few formal wins by 1979.
Findings¶
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Capital concentration and growth of large plants in the 1960s gave unions a larger organisable base. (p. 6)
the number of intermediate size plants increased 1.6 times from 511 to 833 and the number of large plants more than doubled from 199 to 414.
-
Independent unions organised only a small share of African workers in the most accessible and highest-paid sectors, leaving farm and mine workers unorganised. (p. 8)
the independent trade unions were only organizing African workers who were in the highest paid sectors of the economy in the 1970s.
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The state's works and liaison committee system failed to deflect African unionism. (p. 9)
But instead, African workers showed no interest in statutory works committees. By January 1973, there were a mere 24 of these committees in existence.
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In 1976 the unions suffered several simultaneous setbacks: Soweto, recession, lost disputes, and bannings. (p. 15)
in November 1976, the state imposed the most repressive measures yet taken against the independent unions when it prohibited the participation of twenty-two activists
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The motives for the Wiehahn Commission included skills shortages, conflict and international pressure. (p. 18)
the shortages of skilled manpower that became apparent during the boom years of the 1960s and threatened to put a stranglehold on economic growth.
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Recognition was designed to co-opt and regulate African unions through registration. (p. 19)
the state intended to co-opt African unions into the formal industrial relations system and to extend some state control over them.
-
Union membership and recognition agreements grew rapidly after 1979. (p. 20)
between 1979 and 1983, they increased from a mere five to no less than 406 with the FOSATU unions accounting for 285 or 70% of the agreements.
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Despite the growth, the independent unions still covered only a small part of the Black labour force. (p. 20)
The 'independent' unions had therefore only organized about 8 % of the total Black labour force by 1983.
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The 1981 East Rand strikes shifted union demands towards challenging managerial control. (p. 21)
Out of the 50 strikes, well over half challenged managerial control over issues like unfair dismissals and the arbitrary action of foremen.
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The NUM grew quickly after its 1982 founding and held the first legal strike by African mineworkers in 1984. (p. 22)
The NUM held the first ever legal strike by African mine workers in the country's history when 64,000 mine workers in eight gold mines came out on strike in September 1984.
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The November 1984 Witwatersrand stayaway marked unions' entry into broader political action. (p. 23)
in a mass stayaway supported by anything from between 300,000 to 800,000 workers.
Evidence ledger¶
Sources used¶
| Source | Kind | Period | How used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mouton Commission, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act, 1955 (RP64/1977) | commission or official report | 1969-1972 (survey period) | Establishes high concentration of economic power, with the largest 10% of firms controlling at least 74.6% of markets, during the 1960s boom. |
| Bureau of Statistics, Industrial Census, 1961-62, Report No. 303 | industrial mining census | 1961-62 | Provides plant counts by size in 1961 to show the growth of intermediate and large manufacturing plants. |
| Department of Statistics, Census of Manufacturing, 1972, Report No. 10-21-28 | industrial mining census | 1972 | Provides 1972 plant counts by size, showing intermediate plants rising from 511 to 833 and large plants from 199 to 414. |
| Central Statistical Services, South African Statistics 1982, Table 7.5 | official statistical series | 1970-1982 | Gives the African labour force by sector, and the 1980 economically active Black population used to compute union density (about 8%). |
| Simkins and Hindson, 'The Division of Labour in South Africa', DSRG Working Paper No. 7 (Tables IXA, IXD) | secondary literature compilation | c.1970-1979 | Supplies the occupational distribution by colour (Whites over 98% of senior posts) and the African working-class share of wage employment (90% in 1971, 87% in 1979). |
| Schneier, 'Occupational Mobility among Blacks in South Africa', SALDRU Working Paper No. 58, Table 3 | secondary literature compilation | 1971-1979 | Supports the claim that the share of unskilled labour in the African working class fell from 76% to 69%. |
| Bloch, 'The Development of Manufacturing Industry in South Africa 1939-1969' (M.A. thesis), survey of foreign affiliates | secondary literature compilation | early 1970s | Survey result showing that only 4% of local affiliates of foreign firms said the parent had no direct influence over production decisions, evidencing dependency. |
| Tomlinson, 'The Role of Private Foreign Investment and Multinational Corporations in the Economic Development of South Africa' (MBA dissertation) | secondary literature compilation | 1960s-1975 | Supports the shift of foreign investment from indirect to direct investment. |
| Miller, 'Trade Unions in South Africa 1970-1980: a Directory and Statistics', SALDRU Working Paper No. 45; Lundall, Schroeder and Young, Directory of South African Trade Unions (1984) | secondary literature compilation | 1970-1983 | Source of independent-union signed-up and claimed membership and of the number of recognition agreements (5 to 406, FOSATU 285). |
| Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1982 (SAIRR) | official statistical series | 1982 | Used with Central Statistical Services to give the 1980 economically active Black population of 7.7 million and the union density of about 8%. |
| Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation (as described; no report citation) | commission or official report | 1977-1979 | Its recommendations (registration of African unions, industrial court) explain the 1979 shift in state policy; the report is not cited directly. |
| Industrial Conciliation Act (1956; amended 1979 and 1981, renamed Labour Relations Act) and Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act 1953 | legislation gazette | 1953-1981 | Defines the dualistic industrial relations system and the legal changes in 1979 and 1981 toward registration and control of African unions. |
| Hansard (7 June 1979), column 8031; Minister of Labour statement; 1953 Minister of Labour statement quoted via Horner | parliamentary debates | 1953, 1979 | Shows the state's concern about union involvement in politics as part of explaining the 1979 recognition policy. |
| Financial Mail (various issues 1984-1985) | newspapers periodicals | April 1984 - January 1985 | Source for NUM membership and agreements, the September 1984 mine strike, SAAWU's split, and the November 1984 stayaway. |
| South African Labour Bulletin articles and Labour Monitor Group report (e.g. Baskin on 1981 East Rand strike wave; Lambert and Lambert 1982; Labour Monitor Group 1985) | newspapers periodicals | 1976-1985 | Provide strike counts and causes in 1981-82 (50 strikes in 1981; 62% of 1982 strikes at union-organized firms) and the November 1984 stayaway. |
| Author's primary-source research for Ph.D. thesis (UCT) on the independent unions | author survey or fieldwork | 1970s | Underlies the narrative of the origins, strategies, setbacks and recovery of the independent unions in the 1970s; references omitted. |
| Secondary sources on earlier union movements (Wickens on ICU; Roux, Time Longer Than Rope; Luckhardt and Wall on SACTU) | secondary literature compilation | 1919-1960s | Supply membership figures for the ICU (150,000) and CNETU (119 unions, 158,000 in 1945) and the SACTU history. |
Inference¶
Quantification: Descriptive tables.
Historical narrative and periodisation of the independent unions, drawing on the author's primary-source research and union directories, backed by descriptive statistics on plant size, labour force composition, membership and recognition agreements; the explanation for union survival is argued through five interpretive factors rather than tested.
Key claims¶
| Claim | Basis | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| The 1960s boom concentrated capital and expanded large manufacturing plants, creating a base for union organization. (p. 283) | Mouton Commission findings plus the 1961-62 Industrial Census and 1972 Census of Manufacturing plant counts by size. | Systematic data |
| Independent unions organized only in the highest-paid sectors, covering 22.6% of the African labour force; agricultural and mine workers remained unorganized. (p. 285) | Central Statistical Services, South African Statistics 1982, Table 7.5 for sector employment shares. | Systematic data |
| The 1976 Soweto uprising, recession and bannings brought the unions to their lowest ebb, collapsing organization on the Witwatersrand and Western Cape. (p. 292) | Author's thesis research on union histories; no figures or documents cited in the article. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| After the 1979 policy change, signed-up membership rose from about 70,000 to almost 300,000 and recognition agreements from five to 406 between 1979 and 1983. (p. 297) | SALDRU directories by Miller and Lundall et al. | Partial data |
| By 1983 the independent unions had organized only about 8% of the Black labour force. (p. 297) | Union membership (SALDRU directories) divided by the 1980 economically active Black population (SAIRR Survey 1982; Central Statistical Services). | Partial data |
| The state shifted in 1979 from repression to recognition owing to skills shortages, industrial and political conflict, international pressure, and the changed class base of government. (p. 295) | Wiehahn Commission recommendations, the 1979 Industrial Conciliation Act amendment, a Hansard statement, and secondary analysis (Bonner and Webster). | Partial data |
| Dependence on foreign capital and international pressure helped union survival, as unions targeted subsidiaries of multinationals. (p. 293) | Bloch's survey of foreign affiliates and the author's primary research on union campaigns; the effect is asserted, not measured. | Illustrative or anecdotal |
| The 1982 strike level was the highest since the Second World War, with 62% of strikes at union-organized enterprises; the NUM grew quickly to 110,000 members. (p. 298) | Lambert and Lambert's calculation, Baskin, the Lundall directory and Financial Mail. | Partial data |
The author's caveats¶
Notes that claimed membership is 'a considerably less reliable indicator' than signed-up membership, that no in-depth research exists on CNETU's workplace organization, and that the extent of foreign control of manufacturing is hard to determine. Primary source references are omitted from the article.
Gaps in the evidence¶
The argument rests on the author's unreferenced thesis research, so the key claims on union strategy, setbacks and management response cannot be checked against archives, union minutes or interviews. Causal claims about international pressure, the Durban strike wave and the state's change of policy would need company records, Department of Labour files, Wiehahn Commission evidence and Cabinet or parliamentary sources. Plant-level or firm-level data on recognition, wages and strikes (Department of Manpower strike statistics, union membership audits) existed then and, with the thesis and union archives, could test the argument better.
Replicability: Data poorly documented.